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BANKRUPTCY & THE UNDERWATER
HOME: A CASE FOR REAL PROPERTY
REDEMPTION
David Sheinfeld*

ABSTRACT
Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code exists to satisfy the claims of
creditors and preserve an economic “fresh start” for the debtor after
bankruptcy. In exchange for surrendering her property to the trustee to have it
monetized (i.e., sold), the debtor receives a discharge of her debts and an
injunction against future creditor in personam actions to recover them.
However, the in personam injunction is insufficient to protect consumer
debtors who are in default on mortgages encumbering underwater homes
because the creditor’s in rem rights remain; after the conclusion of the case,
the creditor can continue foreclosure proceedings, which result in eviction and
often homelessness. The economic, educational, and health externalities of
foreclosure and homelessness are detrimental to individuals and harmful to
society at large. The Bankruptcy Code already possesses the tool to prevent
these harms without disadvantaging creditors—the right to redeem under
§ 722—but currently restricts redemption to personal property. This Note
argues for a statutory amendment to § 722 that extends the right of redemption
to real property.
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INTRODUCTION
The home is the foundation of modern American society. For renters and
owners alike, where someone lives represents ties to history and community and
determines access to social services. For homeowners—representing around
65% of all occupied housing in 2018 1—the home is also usually their primary
asset. 2 Psychologically, home ownership is a manifestation of the American
Dream and provides a mechanism for families to achieve lasting economic security. 3 Home ownership in one generation creates economic and educational
benefits for subsequent generations through stability during child-rearing years
and a future inheritance. 4
Beyond the mere absence of positive effects, lack of adequate shelter threatens life and health. 5 Without an address, jobless and homeless individuals have
difficulty finding and keeping employment, further contributing to poor health,

* J.D. Candidate, University of Michigan Law School, May 2021. I would like to thank the
Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review for their effort and help throughout the publication process. I am similarly indebted to Professors Bagenstos and Pottow for their guidance and to
Conor Bradley for his insight. Many thanks to my family, friends, and Tara for their continued support.
1. Jennifer Ruden, Homeownership rate in the United States from 1990 to 2018, STATISTA
(Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/184902/homeownership-rate-in-the-us-since2003/.
2. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2007 to 2010: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 98 Fed. Reserve Bulletin 1, 48 (2012) (available at
https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2012/pdf/scf12.pdf); see, e.g., Maniska Thakor, Five
Expenses That Will Consume 50 Percent Of Your Lifetime Earnings, FORBES (Aug. 2, 2010),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/work-in-progress/2010/08/02/lifetime-earnings-home-car-childreneducation-retirement/#7596b22b507d.
3. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Record of Achievement – Expanding Home Ownership, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/achievement
/chap7.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2019) (describing the “American Dream Downpayment Act”); see
also President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Responsible Homeownership,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/06/remarks-president-responsiblehomeownership (Aug. 8, 2013) (“[T]he most tangible cornerstone that lies at the heart of the American Dream, at the heart of middle-class life—and that’s the chance to own your own home. The
chance to own your own home.”).
4. Heather Sandstrom & Sandra Huerta, The Negative Effects of Instability on Child Development: A Research Synthesis, URBAN INSTITUTE, at 28 (Sept. 2013), https://www.urban.org
/sites/default/files/publication/32706/412899-The-Negative-Effects-of-Instability-on-ChildDevelopment-A-Research-Synthesis.PDF.
5. Health and Homelessness, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, https://www.apa.org
/pi/ses/resources/publications/homelessness-health (last visited Nov. 10, 2019); see also INST. OF
MED. (US) COMM. ON HEALTH CARE FOR HOMELESS PEOPLE (1988), HOMELESSNESS, HEALTH,
AND HUMAN NEEDS: HEALTH PROBLEMS OF HOMELESS PEOPLE, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
/books/NBK218236/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
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economic, and educational outcomes for them and their families. 6 Furthermore,
when a homeowner falls behind on her mortgage payments, she and her family
risk losing their home and the safety it provides. Foreclosure proceedings result
in eviction and its associated harms. 7 When a home is worth less than the outstanding mortgage, which frequently happens in economic downturns, 8 the
debtor will end up with nothing, even after saving up for a down payment and
making years of monthly payments.
Even though bankruptcy’s debt discharge is robust, the system fails to provide an adequate safety valve for debtors who are in default on their underwater
homes. By filing bankruptcy, these debtors get the nominal benefit of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code’s protections, including the automatic stay (which enjoins
creditor activity to pursue collections or foreclosure) and the opportunity to prevent creditors from seizing their assets. However, due to statutory restrictions
or structural impediments, these opportunities fail debtors in underwater homes.
As a result, Chapter 7 bankruptcy filers—an average of 725,000 per year since
2005, representing 68% of all consumer filings 9—gain nothing but the automatic stay’s temporary delay before eventual foreclosure and eviction.
This Note argues for a statutory change to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the
“Code”) extending the right to redeem to real property. Part I provides short
histories of the U.S. bankruptcy system and redemption, both in equity and in
modern statute. Part II analyzes current bankruptcy law and explains how its
shortcomings harm debtors. Part III outlines the proposed change and the economic and social benefits it confers on both debtors and creditors and also addresses potential counterarguments.

6. See, e.g., Getting a Job Without an Address, SUV LIVING (Aug. 18, 2012),
http://aboutsuvliving.blogspot.com/2012/08/getting-job-without-address.html.
7. Leigh Thompson, What Happens After Foreclosure & the Property Is Sold?, SFGATE:
HOME GUIDES (last visited Nov. 10, 2019), https://homeguides.sfgate.com/happens-afterforeclosure-property-sold-55824.html; see also Amy Loftsgordon, Foreclosure Timeline: Getting
Notice to Leave, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/free-books/foreclosure-book
/chapter9-5.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2019); Foreclosure and Eviction for Homeowners
MICH. LEGAL HELP, https://michiganlegalhelp.org/self-help-tools/housing/foreclosure-and-evictionhomeowners.
8. See Michele Conlin & Robin Respaut, Millions of Americans still trapped in debt-logged
homes ten years after crisis, REUTERS (Sept. 14, 2018, 8:21 AM), https://www.reuters.com
/article/us-usa-housing-underwater-insight/millions-of-americans-still-trapped-in-debt-loggedhomes-ten-years-after-crisis-idUSKCN1LU0EP; see also Andrea Riquier, Has the housing market
recovered? Ask the 1.4 million homeowners still underwater, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 14, 2017,
10:58 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/has-the-housing-market-recovered-ask-the-14million-underwater-homeowners-2017-12-13.
9. UNITED STATES COURTS, Just the Facts: Consumer Bankruptcy Filings, 2006-2017
(Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2018/03/07/just-facts-consumer-bankruptcy-filings2006-2017.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. A (Short) Overview of the Bankruptcy System
At the highest level of abstraction, the U.S. bankruptcy system exists to facilitate individual and business debt restructuring, rehabilitation, and liquidation. The system is broken down into six “chapters” to accommodate the practical needs of a diverse range of debtor attributes, goals, and sizes: 7
(liquidations), 9 (municipal), 11 (reorganization for businesses and individuals
with debts above a certain amount), 12 (family farmers and fishermen), 13 (individual reorganization), and 15 (international). Proceedings can be opened
“voluntarily” (by the debtor) or “involuntarily” (by creditors under statutory
guidance). This distinction refers to how the case begins, not the debtor’s subjective feelings; though someone filing for bankruptcy to stave off foreclosure
or other creditor action may feel as though her back is against the wall, in bankruptcy parlance her filing is voluntary.
Filing under any chapter of the Code does two key things: (1) creates the
bankruptcy “estate” and (2) automatically stays a variety of creditor action
against the debtor or property of the estate. The bankruptcy estate is, in effect, a
trust containing the debtor’s property which is held for the benefit of creditors.
Notably, “property of the estate” does not simply follow state law property concepts, but rather is its own term of art under federal bankruptcy law and can
contain things of value not considered property under state law. 10 However, not
all debtor property enters the estate; the bankruptcy system allows property exempted from seizure by judgment creditors under state or federal law to remain
outside the estate and therefore unavailable for creditor repayment. 11 Depending on whether the bankruptcy case is a liquidation or a reorganization, either a
trustee or the debtor as “debtor-in-possession” administers the estate. The automatic stay is an immediate injunction against creditor action to collect debts
from a debtor who has declared bankruptcy or from property of the estate.
While subject to exceptions, the automatic stay is powerful and broad. It applies to all entities and a diverse array of potential behavior, including commencement or continuance of a judicial proceeding against the debtor, enforcement of a judgment against the debtor or property of the estate, any act to obtain
possession or exercise control over property of the estate, any creation, perfection, or enforcement of a lien, and more. 12 Further, the automatic stay has teeth;
“willful” violations (those done deliberately and intentionally with knowledge

10. See, e.g., In re Burgess, 234 B.R. 793, 799 (D. Nev. 1999) (finding a brothel license to
be “property of the estate” although the license was not property under Nevada state law).
11. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 522.
12. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
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of the automatic stay) allow recovery for actual damages, costs, and attorneys’
fees, and, where appropriate, punitive damages. 13
State law and the Code treat debt differently according to how they were incurred and whether the creditor has any property rights in specific collateral. At
a threshold level, creditors are either “secured” or “unsecured” based on their
claim. An entire body of law (secured transactions and Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code) dictates the creation, attachment, and perfection of security
interests in property; relevant for this discussion is simply that in most cases,
secured parties gain rights (a lien) in collateral through negotiation in the credit
transaction. The effect of becoming a secured party is that upon the debtor’s
default, the creditor can repossess the collateral and sell it to recover or mitigate
its loss. A mortgage lender is the archetypical secured lender. When someone
“mortgages” their house, they borrow money from a lender in exchange for a
promise to repay (including interest) and a lien, which gives the lender the right
to foreclose and sell the house upon default. Automobile financers are another
common example. In exchange for lending a debtor money to cover the purchase price of the automobile, the lender receives the right to repossess and sell
the car upon default. Unsecured creditors, on the other hand, do not have a security interest in collateral. Think of, for example, a tort victim, credit card
company, or supplier. 14 These kinds of creditors cannot simply repossess and
sell property to cover their losses; instead, they must sue (either in tort or in
contract for breach), receive a monetary judgment, record the judgment to form
rights in property, and have the state (typically via a sheriff) seize the property
and conduct a sale. Secured status also means that when the collateral is sold,
secured lenders are repaid first; unsecured creditors can only be paid out of the
surplus, which reduces their likelihood for recovery. These are some of the
main reasons why mortgage interest rates are typically much lower than credit
card interest rates.
When an individual consumer debtor voluntarily files for bankruptcy, she
does so under a specific chapter depending on her attributes and goals. For
simplicity’s sake, this discussion will focus on chapters 7 and 13, as these two
represent nearly all individual filings in the U.S. In a Chapter 7 liquidation, all
of a debtor’s non-exempt property comprises the estate, which she surrenders to
a court appointed trustee in exchange for a discharge of her debts and an injunction against future collections efforts by creditors. The trustee then sells the assets and distributes the proceeds among the creditors depending on their statutorily defined priority. Consumer Chapter 7 cases typically take a few months

13. Id. § 362(h); see, e.g., In re Green, 2011 WL 5902502, at *3–4 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct.
20, 2011) (finding that routine collections letters sent after the debtor notified one department of the
filing of the bankruptcy petition by a different department with no knowledge of the petition constituted a violation of the automatic stay).
14. In certain limited circumstances sellers of goods retain security interests in property under Article 9; for the purpose of this introductory discussion, these suppliers are treated as unsecured creditors.
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and creditors usually receive a small fraction of the amount they are owed. In
contrast, Chapter 13 is known as the “wage-earner’s plan,” where a debtor with
regular income fashions a three- or five-year plan (under the court’s supervision) to keep their assets and repay existing creditors with future earnings. 15
Here, the debtor keeps her property throughout the plan and only receives the
discharge upon the plan’s successful completion. In order for a plan to be approved by the court, creditors must be projected to receive at least as much as
they would in a hypothetical liquidation, including interest to represent the value (rather than the amount) of their claim. 16
The statutory provision at issue in this Note applies in Chapter 7. Chapter 7
debtors must state what they plan to do with property that is encumbered by a
lien (i.e., property that is not exempt from seizure by unsecured creditors or that
the debtor voluntarily pledged as collateral). There are three formal (and one
informal) options available to the debtor: redemption, which this Note focuses
on; reaffirmation; surrender; and ride-through. The strengths and weaknesses of
these options are discussed in depth in Part II(b).
The moral and policy considerations that undergird the bankruptcy system
have deep roots. Tracing back to biblical Jubilees and beyond, debt forgiveness
is engrained in the Judeo-Christian value system that the American Founders
saw themselves codifying in the Constitution. 17 New beginnings have remained
deeply connected with the American psyche; from homestead acts to “streets
paved with gold,” domestic policy has long embodied commitment to economic
and social rebirth. 18 Bankruptcy law is no exception to this phenomenon. By
preserving the debtor’s fresh start after bankruptcy, proponents argue, the bankruptcy system provides an important rehabilitative function to those who need it
the most. 19
Even more, debtor rehabilitation has positive externalities; a system that
leaves bankrupt debtors destitute strains welfare services and hamstrings society. As one scholar puts it, “society as a whole also loses when moping bankrupt
debtors are distracted from working at their highest and best use level of
productivity because they are instead coping with financial ruin.” 20 The bank-

15. See Steve Nitz, The Different Chapters of Bankruptcy Explained, NFCC (Sept. 22,
2017), https://www.nfcc.org/resources/blog/different-chapters-bankruptcy-explained/.
16. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii); see also Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004).
17. Vincent L. Leibell, Jr., The Chandler Act-Its Effect Upon the Law of Bankruptcy, 9
FORDHAM L. REV. 380, 380–81 (1940) (discussing history of bankruptcy, debt relief, and passage of
Constitution).
18. Streets Paved With Gold, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/elis/learn/education
/streets-paved-with-gold.htm (“For generations, our ancestors came to this nation filled with endless
hopes and dreams. The rumor that American streets were “paved with gold” created anticipation and
excitement in the hearts of those seeking a better life.”).
19. See Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.J.
1047, 1088 (1987).
20. John A.E. Pottow, Private Liability for Reckless Consumer Lending, U. ILL. L. REV. 405,
412 (2007).
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ruptcy system implements its “fresh start” goal by exempting certain of the
debtor’s property from seizure by unsecured creditors and making invalid nonpossessory, non-purchase money security interests in heirlooms, clothing, furniture, tools of the trade, and health aids. 21 In short, there are some things that are
off-limits to creditors, either because of dignitary or leverage concerns (i.e. the
creditor cannot seize clothing or heirlooms to satisfy debt or bully the debtor) or
to preserve rehabilitative prospects (automobile equity, tools of the trade, etc.).
On the other hand, there is an equally deep tradition in paying back debts.
Filing for bankruptcy has powerful moral implications. Taking on debt is fundamentally a promise to repay money—an important legal and moral promise—
that should be given solemn weight. Filing bankruptcy is a decision to repudiate these promises made in exchange for goods, services, and other promises. 22
These promises are not empty or symbolic; “[o]f such promises and reciprocity
is the fabric of civil society woven.” 23 From a structural economic perspective,
debt repayment facilitates cheap credit availability and trust in the financial system as loans are repaid. The easier it is for a debtor to renege on their obligations, the thinking goes, the more likely a marginal debtor is to take advantage
of the system and shirk debts they otherwise have the financial capacity to
pay. 24 Extending the scenario to its logical outcome, lenders will be less certain
of repayment and will in fact have fewer loans repaid to completion, reducing
the amount of available credit and raising the cost of credit for those that can get
it. In this line of thought, debt erasure is not an unqualified moral or economic
good as it imposes costs on other system participants and represents broken
commitments. 25
B. History of the U.S. Bankruptcy System
The U.S. Constitution provides for federal bankruptcy law and courts in Article I. 26 However, excepting some short periods in the early- and midnineteenth century where legislation was enacted and repealed (often within the

21. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f), H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 361 (1977).
22. Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It’s Time for Means-Testing, 1999 BYU L. REV. 177,
181 (1999).
23. Id.
24. See President George W. Bush, Remarks at the Signing of [BAPCPA] (April 20, 2005)
(transcript available in the White House Archives) (“[T]oo many people have abused the bankruptcy
laws. They’ve walked away from debts even when they had the ability to repay them.”).
25. The true culprit, though, is not debt erasure specifically but rather nonpayment generally.
To a lender, there is little economic difference between formal discharge and the simple inability to
draw blood from a stone; either way, the lender bears a loss. This suggests that redemption of underwater homes does not impose additional costs on lenders (or other market participants) as the
redemption payment replaces the sale of the foreclosed home to recoup losses (as discussed below
in Part III(b)(i)).
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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same decade), there was no federal bankruptcy law in the United States. 27 In
fact, perhaps due to ebbs and flows of political pressure, no uniform bankruptcy
law had any staying power until the very end of the nineteenth century. 28 When
these systems were in effect, though, they were notably creditor-friendly,
providing for such punitive measures as civil confinement in debtor’s prisons
for failure to repay debts. 29 In 1898, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Act and
enacted the first modern federal bankruptcy law. 30 This new regime was meaningfully different from its predecessors in several ways, establishing both the
“referee” position to oversee administration of cases and the office of the trustee, as well as providing for the reorganization (rather than liquidation) of corporations. 31 Even so, the federal bankruptcy law had problems, leading to several amendments over the next half-century. 32
In this context, Congress overhauled the 1898 Bankruptcy Act in 1978 and
created the modern Bankruptcy Code and court system with the Bankruptcy Reform Act (the “Act”). 33 In adopting the new Code, Congress aimed to balance
the economic “fresh start” and productive rehabilitation of the debtor with the
rights of creditors. 34 In addition to effecting structural changes to the court system and endowing bankruptcy judges with substantial power, the Act was notably debtor friendly. Among other changes, the new Code included an expansive
list of exemptions which exceeded previously available allotments, protected
those exemptions from judicial liens, expanded the types of debts that could be
discharged, and introduced the right to redeem personal property in Chapter 7. 35
While the direct effects of these changes on consumer filings are disputed in
27. David A. Skeel, Jr., The Genius of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, 15 BANKR. DEV. J. 321, 323
(1999) (“[T]he standard story of American bankruptcy history is a tale of bust and boom. On this
view, we have the Depression of 1793 to thank for the 1800 Bankruptcy Act; and the Panics of
1837, 1857, and 1893 to thank for the 1841, 1867, and 1898 Acts. Once the first three acts had done
their initial work and economic conditions improved, Congress repealed the federal legislation and
left insolvency law to the states.”).
28. Id. at 322 (“Under ordinary circumstances, there was not enough political support to
keep a permanent bankruptcy law in place. But the nation was periodically thrown into turmoil by
deep economic depressions. These depressions provoked loud cries for bankruptcy legislation. Congress responded to this pressure by passing bankruptcy laws, but it then repealed the laws when the
depression passed and support for federal bankruptcy regulation receded.”).
29. Debtors’ Prison Relief Act of 1792, Ch. 29, 1 Stat. 265; Debt Imprisonment Abolishment
Act of 1839, Ch. 35, 5 Stat. 321; see 28 U.S.C. § 2007.
30. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544.
31. The Evolution of U.S. Bankruptcy Law: A Time Line, FED. JUD. CTR.,
https://www.rib.uscourts.gov/newhome/docs/the_evelution_of_bankruptcy_law.pdf; Bradley Hanson, Bankruptcy Law in the United States, https://eh.net/encyclopedia/bankruptcy-law-in-the-unitedstates/.
32. Leibell, supra note 17, at 385–86.
33. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–598, 92 Stat. 2549.
34. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934); KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND
FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 91 (Yale Univ. Press 1997).
35. Ian Domowitz & Thomas L. Eovaldi, The Impact of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
on Consumer Bankruptcy, 36 J. L. & ECON. 803, 807–08 (1993).
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light of changing economic conditions, between 1980 and 2004, consumer
bankruptcy filings grew at an average rate of 7.6% per year. 36 As of 2005, the
filing rate was 5.4 per 1,000 people, more than four times the 1980 rate and
nearly 80 times the 1920 rate. 37
Determining (perhaps incorrectly) that consumers were “abusing” the system and filing bankruptcy too easily, Congress substantially amended the Code
in 2005 with the passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act (BAPCPA). 38 BAPCPA came down hard on consumer filers by
curtailing a debtor’s flexibility in choosing under which chapter of bankruptcy
to file and removing key debtor-friendly attributes of the system. Specifically,
BAPCPA introduced the “means test” to push more debtors into Chapter 13,
reduced the scope of the Chapter 13 “super discharge,” and mandated that consumer filers receive credit counseling and financial management training before
filing. 39 While scholars debate the effect of these changes on filing behavior
considering macroeconomic forces, normative sentiment against “being a bank-

36. Thomas A. Garrett, The Rise in Personal Bankruptcies: The Eighth Federal Reserve District and Beyond, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. (2007), https://files.stlouisfed.org
/files/htdocs/publications/review/07/01/Garrett.pdf [hereinafter Rise in Personal Bankruptcies] (examining potential explanations for the rise in consumer bankruptcy filings); Thomas A. Garrett &
Lesli S. Ott, Up, Up and Away: Personal Bankruptcies Soar! REGIONAL ECONOMIST, at 10, 11 (Oct.
2005), https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/october-2005/up-up-and-awaypersonal-bankruptcies-soar [hereinafter Up, Up and Away].
37. Rise in Personal Bankruptcies, supra note 36, at 15; Up, Up and Away, supra note 36.
38. Pub. L. No. 109–8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C.).
39. The “means test” is a rigid process which requires the bankruptcy court to presume
abuse for certain Chapter 7 filings, which results in either their dismissal or conversion to Chapter
13. First, the means test requires calculating a debtor’s “current monthly income” (actually, a sixmonth retrospective calculation) and comparing it to the median income in the debtor’s region. If
the debtor is below-median, she may proceed to Chapter 7. If she is above-median, the means test
proscribes a budget to apply to the debtor’s expenses based on her region and family size, but without consideration of her actual assets, liabilities, family situation, or need. For example, the means
test may assume that a debtor spends $50.00 per month for gasoline or transportation expenses. That
determination applies both to a debtor who walks to work and one who must commute an hour by
car. After applying the budget to the debtor’s expenses, the court calculates a debtor’s “disposable
income”—namely, any income beyond those statutorily allocated amounts. Because Chapter 13
plans require that all of a debtor’s disposable income be used to repay creditors if it exceeds a certain dollar amount per month (on paper), any gap between a debtor’s actual expenses and the statutory count hurts her. The debtor who walks to work and spends less than $50.00 per month on
transportation cannot reallocate the “saved” money in the budget to an item on which she exceeds
the statutory cap, like her food expense. As a result, the money spent on food above the statutory
count will be considered disposable income, regardless of its necessity. Similarly, the debtor who
exceeds $50.00 per month in transportation costs receives no flexibility; the money she spends
commuting above the $50.00 threshold will be considered disposable income. As of publication,
those who end up with a monthly disposable income above $166.67 are deemed ineligible for Chapter 7. ELIZABETH WARREN ET AL., THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 253–80 (Wolters
Kluwer, 7th ed. 2014); 11 U.S.C. §§ 707(b)(2), 109(h), 1325(b); William D. Weber, Chapter 13
“Super” Discharge Shrinks, WEBER LAW FIRM, P.C., https://weberlaw.com/bankruptcy-reformindex/chapter-13-super-discharge-shrinks/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2020).
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rupt,” and recognition that most filings follow a traumatic financial event (job
loss, marital status change, or medical bills), 40 BAPCPA’s passage coincided
with a sharp drop in consumer filings. 41
C. The Equity of Redemption and the Statutory Right to Redeem
The principle behind redemption (one of the Chapter 7 debtor’s three options for encumbered property) dates back to the English Courts of Equity. 42
Before the modern statutory scheme governing security interests developed,
land owners who wanted to grant a mortgage on their property executed a conveyance of legal title to the lender as security for the loan. 43 Upon successful
repayment of the loan, the mortgagor (land owner) could petition the courts to
compel the mortgagee to transfer the property back to the mortgagor. 44 But if
the mortgagor was unsuccessful in repaying the loan, the land vested in the
lender and the mortgagor’s claim to title was terminated. 45 Because the mortgage debt was typically lower than the value of the property, usurious lenders
would dispossess debtors upon simple defaults, resulting in windfalls. 46 To illustrate, imagine you own a farm worth $10,000, encumbered by a $8,000
mortgage. One month, you are a few days late paying because you forgot, or
you committed another simple default. Because the mortgagee holds title to the
land, your default would vest ownership of the $10,000 farm to the lender, even
though you had only borrowed $8,000. The equity of redemption allowed debtors to combat forfeiture upon simple default by bringing past payments up to
date. 47 To prevent the debtor’s continued possession of the land during a true
default, the lender could foreclose the debtor’s right of redemption through a
judicial process, fully extinguishing the debtor’s claims to the land. 48 Upon

40. See David U. Himmelstein et al., Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results
of a National Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 741, 741–46 (2009), https://www.amjmed.com/article/S00029343(09)00404-5/fulltext; see generally WARREN ET AL., supra note 38, at 305–22.
41. WARREN ET AL., supra note 39, at 321.
42. Thomas W. Bigley, Property Law—The Equity of Redemption: Who Decides When it
Ends?, 21 WILLIAM MITCHELL L. REV. 315, 317 n.11 (1995) (“Equitable redemption rights arose
from English Courts of Equity and reflect the court’s desire to balance power between the mortgagor and mortgagee.”).
43. Id. at 318–19.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 319–20.
47. Id.; see also id. at 319 n.19 (‘“After Edward the First, the English Courts of Equity introduced equitable redemption to weaken the mortgagee’s usurious control over the debtor.’ This
balancing of power between the mortgagee and the debtor gave the debtor the ability to redeem his
property despite a payment default.”).
48. Id. at 320–21. Extinguishing the debtor’s claims to the land allowed the creditor to sell
the land with a clean (uncontested) title to recoup its losses.
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foreclosure, the debtor could no longer petition the court for the equity of redemption. 49 These are the origins of today’s vocabulary.
In the modern context, statutes prescribe how security interests are formed,
granted, and managed. As a result, the traditional equity of redemption morphed as states codified versions of it into their property law. 50 The statutory
right to redeem differs from the equity of redemption in several respects, but the
two most important are: (1) it can provide an opportunity for a debtor to redeem
the property after foreclosure, and (2) the debtor can only redeem by paying the
full amount of the debt (or sometimes the foreclosure sale price), not just by
curing the arrearage. 51 These attributes afford the debtor more time to save her
home (statutory rights to redeem can, in some states, be exercised up to a year
after the foreclosure sale) and can avoid forfeiture of the debtor’s equity due to
the severe market imperfections surrounding foreclosure sales, which artificially
deflate home values. 52 Today, roughly half of the states have statutory rights to
redeem on the books. 53
II. THE LAW TODAY
Part II begins by explaining how residential homes are treated under the
Bankruptcy Code, describing how state and federal exemptions prevent certain
lien creditors (e.g., a successful tort plaintiff) from seizing and selling particular
property to satisfy their debt. These protections, however, do not enjoin mortgagees, as the debtor voluntarily granted the lien. Part II(b) discusses the four
options a Chapter 7 debtor has to address debts secured by property—
redemption, reaffirmation, surrender, and ride through—and why each fails to
protect underwater homeowners.
A. Homesteads Under the Bankruptcy Code
Every state exempts certain property from involuntary seizure by creditors,
but the breadth and depth of the exemption varies from state to state. This
means that judgment lien creditors cannot look to certain property for repayment by the debtor. However, a debtor can waive the exemption by granting a
voluntary security interest in otherwise exempt property. 54 While every state
exempts homesteads (primary residential homes) to some extent from seizure
by judgment creditors, this exemption does not prevent foreclosure and sale by

49. Id. at 318.
50. See id.
51. U.C.C. § 9-623 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000); AllLaw, The Right of
Redemption, https://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/foreclosure/right-of-redemption.html.
52. See generally Christopher J. Mayer, Assessing the Performance of Real Estate Auctions
(Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Working Paper No. 93-1, 1993).
53. AllLaw, supra note 51.
54. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (2020).

96

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

[Vol. 10:85

the mortgage lender. The Code incorporates state law exemptions and provides
an alternate set of exemptions in § 522 that the debtor can sometimes elect in
lieu of their state law rights. 55 However, these laws only determine what kinds
of property can be seized and sold by a judicial creditor—because a homeowner
grants a voluntary mortgage to the lender, these rules do not apply. 56
As a result, a debtor who is underwater on her mortgage receives little protection from a foreclosing lender under state or federal exemptions. Chapter 7’s
debt discharge only prohibits in personam actions against the debtor to collect
the defaulted debt; the lien and in rem rights survive. Bankruptcy’s automatic
stay pauses a foreclosure but nothing stops the mortgage lender from continuing
the in rem process after case resolution because the lender’s rights to repossess
the collateral survive. After bankruptcy, an underwater homeowner cannot be
sued and made to pay the full amount of the mortgage but also cannot prevent
the lender from repossessing and selling her home. Bankruptcy for this debtor
only provides a delay of the inevitable.
B. Redemption, Reaffirmation, Surrender, and Ride Through
When a debtor files for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, she must file a Statement of
Intent with respect to all debts secured by property within thirty days of the first
mandatory meeting with creditors. 57 This form provides three options: the
debtor can surrender the property to the creditor in full satisfaction of the debt,
reaffirm the debt and waive the discharge of the debt, or redeem the property
and keep the collateral by paying the lower of the balance of the loan or the value of the collateral. 58 With the creditor’s cooperation, the debtor can also informally “ride through” a debt by continuing to make scheduled payments and
perform the pre-bankruptcy contract. 59
Each of these options fails the Chapter 7 debtor looking to save her home.
Surrender is precisely the opposite outcome that many debtors desire. Reaffirmation nominally provides the debtor an opportunity to negotiate with her lender to reduce monthly payments, extend payment timelines, or even reduce the
balance of the debt. In practice, however, reaffirmation is rarely so debtor
friendly. Knowing that the debtor will emerge from bankruptcy with reduced
overall debt service (due to her other debts being discharged), the lender has little incentive to make accommodations in negotiations. In fact, the lender has
the leverage (threat of repossession) to demand new concessions in the reaf-

55. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (2020).
56. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (2020).
57. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2) (2020).
58. Id.; id. § 722.
59. Samuel J. Turco, Jr., Riding Through the Chapter 7 Backdoor: A Story of Car Loans in
Bankruptcy, NEB. DEBT & BANKRUPTCY BLOG (Aug. 19, 2016), https://www.nebraskadebt
bankruptcyblog.com/2016/08/riding-through-the-chapter-7-backdoor-a-story-of-car-loans-inbankruptcy/.
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firmed agreement, tacking on otherwise non-collectable attorney’s and other
fees. 60 Reaffirmation also includes procedural hurdles, such as court approval
and heightened disclosure requirements. 61 The Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws in the United States (the “Commission”), formed in the early 1970s to report on U.S. bankruptcy law in anticipation of legislative change, recognized
reaffirmation’s key deficiency in its reform recommendations to the House of
Representatives: because collateral is often lower in value than the debt, the discharge relieving the debtor from the unsecured portion of the debt is “neutralized” by the secured creditor’s ability to obtain reaffirmation of the entire debt
under threat of repossession. 62
Ride through is similarly unavailable to these debtors because of the home’s
importance. Maslow’s hierarchy of needs 63 is proven out by a debtor with her
back against the wall; debtors prioritize mortgage payments over certain other
consumer debt, like credit cards, precisely because mortgage lenders have the
ability to foreclose. 64 As a result, failure to pay the mortgage is not simply a
question of resource prioritization but rather a recognition of insufficient resources. A debtor trying to save her home from foreclosure has already defaulted and the bank has lost confidence in the prospect of repayment.
On paper, though, redemption offers clear value to a rehabilitating debtor by
empowering her to unilaterally reduce her debt payment on an asset. Beginning
with the adoption of the Code in 1978, Congress intended that this “new” § 722
be “broader” than the rights of redemption under the Uniform Commercial
Code, authorizing “an individual debtor to redeem tangible personal property
intended primarily for personal, family, or household use, from a lien securing a
nonpurchase money dischargeable consumer debt.” 65 The Commission recommended to the House of Representatives that a consumer debtor be allowed to
redeem collateral securing a dischargeable consumer debt by paying the lesser
of the claim or the appraised value. This change would “result in the secured
creditor’s realizing what he is entitled to, but it will avoid the improper leverage
a secured creditor now enjoys by being able to deprive the debtor of his property unless payment is made.” 66 The House adopted the right to redeem in part

60. See, e.g., In re Pendlebury, 94 B.R. 120, 124–25 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1988) (explaining
that the reaffirmation process does not prohibit lenders from negotiating a provision for the payment
of attorney’s fees).
61. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c), (k) (2020).
62. FRANK R. KENNEDY, COMM’N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, at 10
(1973).
63. See A. H. Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 50 PSYCHOL. REV. 370 (1943).
64. Jacob Conway & Matthew Plosser, When Debts Compete, Which Wins?, FED. RESERVE
BANK OF N.Y.: LIBERTY ST ECON. (Mar. 1, 2017), https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org
/2017/03/when-debts-compete-which-wins.html.
65. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 95 (1978).
66. Letter of Submittal from Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, Pub.
L. No. 95-598 (1973).
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due to the failures of existing state exemption laws to protect debtors from a secured creditor’s foreclosure action after discharge. Discussing the Commission’s recommendation, the House recognized the shortcomings of exemptions
without a concomitant method to remove the secured creditor’s lien:
it does little good to allow the debtor an exemption of wearing apparel, household
goods, or health aids subject to an indefeasible security interest . . . if the debtor
must pay more than the property is worth for the privilege of continuing to use the
property. The fair market value of such property is often substantially less than the
amount owed and little anything can be realized upon forced disposition of the
property. What the creditor really has is leverage to force payment under the present act, since continued use is conditioned on forebearance [sic] by the creditor
67
and forebearance [sic] is exacted at a high price.

The right to redeem solved this problem by allowing a debtor to redeem
“property that would be exempt in the absence of the security interest” upon
payment of the amount of the allowed secured claim. 68 As a result, the right to
redeem furthers the key policy goal of debtor rehabilitation by allowing her to
“retain [her] necessary property and avoid high replacement costs” while still
allowing the creditor to obtain “what [she] is entitled to under the terms of [her]
contract.” 69
A niche finance industry exists to provide bankrupt debtors the lump sum
required to redeem their property. 70 While traditional lenders perceive bankrupt
debtors as financially irresponsible—an assumption undercut by the fact that
62% of consumer filers file bankruptcy as a result of discrete financial trauma 71—redemption financers recognize that these debtors, after the bankruptcy
discharge, will have few liabilities. 72 Instead of trying to balance unmanageable
debt service, the newly-discharged debtor is a blank slate. Even more, the debt
associated with the redeemed asset has been accordingly reduced to reflect its
true value. The debtor is no longer making too-large monthly car loan payments on a rapidly depreciating vehicle, but rather payments in line with the
car’s then-current value. 73 Though interest rates will likely be higher, the reduction in the principal amount of the loan (reflecting the decrease in collateral
value) means that the debtor’s monthly payments will go down. That reduction

67. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 128 (1977).
68. Id. at 127.
69. Id.
70. Without outside intervention, redemption is effectively unavailable to bankrupt debtors
because they must pay off the lender in a lump sum and bankrupt debtors do not typically have piles
of cash sitting around. Redemption financers operate in this gap, lending the redemption payment to
bankrupt debtors.
71. See Himmelstein et al., supra note 40.
72. See Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 67, 87 (2006) (showing that creditors aggressively market to debtors who recently
filed for bankruptcy).
73. See Redemption Program, 722 REDEMPTION FUNDING, INC., https://www.722
redemption.com/debtor/redemptionprogram/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2020).
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of, for example, $300 per month means a world of difference to a debtor in financial distress. Perhaps it even means the difference between insolvency and
solvency.
Unfortunately, the benefits of redemption do not accrue to homeowners because of the statute’s restrictive language. 74 The Code allows debtors to redeem
and keep personal property (e.g., a car) by paying off the lesser of the value of
the collateral or the outstanding debt, but the Code does not extend this protection to real property. 75 For a debtor looking to save her underwater home, this
opportunity to reduce her debt payments to accord with the property’s value is
not even an option.
So why is redemption expressly limited to “tangible personal property intended primarily for personal, family, or household use?” This restriction developed, as mentioned above, because of the failures of the law to protect exemptible assets from post-bankruptcy foreclosure action. Congress’ recognition
that the right to redeem was a “very substantial change” from then-current law
informed their decision to restrict its applicability only to situations where the
secured creditor may have “improper leverage” over exemptible property. 76
While Congress chose not to extend this lifeline to all the debtor’s property,
perhaps Congress viewed foreclosure as “proper” leverage or had an idiosyncratic desire to help debtors save their cars from repossession. Perhaps Congress was concerned about debtor opportunism in cyclical markets; while most
debtors’ redeemable personal property steadily depreciates over time, real estate’s value is more cyclical. This concern is discussed in depth in Part III(c).
III. EXTEND REDEMPTION TO REAL PROPERTY IN CHAPTER 7
Part III(a) begins by outlining the proposed statutory change and presents a
new, revised § 722. The section continues with a discussion of how the new
§ 722 seamlessly interacts with other aspects of bankruptcy law and avoids potential abusive opportunism. Part III(b) outlines the rationales in support of the
proposed change, including the economic benefits to creditors and the economic, health, educational, and social benefits to debtors and society. Part III(c) addresses counterarguments regarding opportunistic debtors, political opposition
to debtor-friendly legislative changes, judicial implementation, and market development.
A. The Change
This Note proposes a simple change to § 722 of the Code: eliminate the
provision’s qualification that redeemable property be “personal.” Section 722
currently reads:

74.
75.
76.

11 U.S.C. § 722.
Id.
S REP. NO. 95-989, at 95 (1978).
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An individual debtor may, whether or not the debtor has waived the right to redeem
under this section, redeem tangible personal property intended primarily for personal, family, or household use, from a lien securing a dischargeable consumer
debt, if such property is exempted under section 522 of this title or has been abandoned under section 554 of this title, by paying the holder of such lien the amount
of the allowed secured claim of such holder that is secured by such lien in full at
77
the time of redemption.

The revised statute reads:
An individual debtor may, whether or not the debtor has waived the right to redeem
under this section, redeem tangible personal or real property intended primarily for
personal, family, or household use, from a lien securing a dischargeable consumer
debt, if such personal property is exempted under section 522 of this title or such
real property is exempted under section 522(d)(1), or such property has been abandoned under section 554 of this title, by paying the holder of such lien the amount
of the allowed secured claim of such holder that is secured by such lien in full at
the time of redemption.

The proposed reform to § 722 permits debtors to redeem real property if it
meets two primary conditions: (1) it must be intended primarily for personal,
family, or household use, and (2) it must be exempted under § 522(d)(1) (the
Code’s exemption for interests in real property used as a residence). 78 A debtor’s underwater home meets these requirements—a family/personal dwelling
satisfies the first requirement and its use as a residence satisfies the second.
This change extends the right to redeem to real property without overexpansion and remains consistent with state and federal policy. Importantly, the requirement that the property be exempt under § 522(d)(1) prevents overexpansion. First, non-exempt property under the Code (or applicable state law) will
remain unredeemable. Second, by restricting real property redemption’s availability to § 522(d)(1), opportunistic filers cannot take advantage of the “wild
card” exemption in (d)(5). Without restriction to (d)(1), a debtor could take advantage of the system by using the (d)(5) wild card exemption for “any property” on, for example, a vacation home. Because the property is “exempted under
section 522,” it would then be redeemable. Since the aim of this statutory
change is to prevent the harms of foreclosure and homelessness, the change restricts itself to redeeming primary residences. Third, because homesteads are at
least partially exempt under the Code and all state law, they would become eligible for redemption under the new § 722. This change is thus limited to the
kinds of property that Congress and the states have deemed uniquely worthy of
protection, precluding this change from thwarting expressed federal or state policy. Because no state permits exemptions for other kinds of real property and
the Code only provides an exemption for real property used as a residence, the
expansion of § 722 will be limited to protecting homesteads.

77.
78.

11 U.S.C. § 722.
11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1).
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B. Rationales in Support
Extending the redemption right to real property confers economic benefits
on all parties and furthers the normative and policy undercurrents supporting the
bankruptcy system. As an economic matter, this change maximizes value for
debtors and creditors by reducing expensive transaction costs and resolving cases more quickly. Importantly, allowing homestead redemption does not come at
the creditor’s expense, as it vindicates the Code’s objective that a secured lender
in Chapter 7 be paid the full value of its allowed secured claim. 79 The change
also saves the debtor and her family from the negative economic and social externalities of foreclosure-induced homelessness, which furthers the bankruptcy
system’s desire to provide debtors a “fresh start.” 80 These benefits accelerate
the debtor on her path to financial rehabilitation while ensuring that she does
not receive a free pass, as she will continue to pay off her home after leaving
bankruptcy.
1. Economic Benefits for the Creditor
Under current law, filing Chapter 7 bankruptcy is at best an inconvenience
to a foreclosing creditor and at worst value destructive. Because the exempt
status of the home does not apply to voluntarily granted security interests, the
bankruptcy process does not substantively affect the relative rights of the defaulted debtor and the creditor. While filing a bankruptcy petition affords the
debtor the benefit of the automatic stay, which pauses the foreclosure action,
that reprieve is only temporary. Where the debt is greater than the value of the
home, the trustee will “abandon” the property (removing it from the estate and
the protection of the automatic stay) and allow the lender to continue the foreclosure process. 81
However, just because a delay is temporary does not mean it is cheap.
Foreclosure destroys value because it exists in a disjointed and inefficient market. First, the foreclosure process takes a long time. 82 Upon initiating a fore-

79. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
80. See supra Part I(a).
81. Kathleen Michon, When Will the Trustee Abandon Property in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy?,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/trustee-abandon-property-chapter-7-bankruptcy
NOLO,
.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2020).
82. There are two kinds of foreclosure proceedings in the United States: judicial and nonjudicial. All states allow judicial foreclosure, where the creditor sues and obtains a judgment. Delays
between initiation of judicial foreclosure and the eventual sale of the property can take months or
even years. See, e.g., Amy Loftsgarden, States With Long Foreclosure Timelines, NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/states-with-long-foreclosure-timelines.html (last visited
Nov. 8, 2020) (stating that the fastest states having average foreclosure timelines between 6–9
months and the “longest” timelines as up to 4 years). Many states, but not all, permit nonjudicial
foreclosure through contract, where the lender initiates foreclosure by sending a notice to the borrower. While faster than judicial foreclosure, nonjudicial foreclosure is far from automatic as statutory restrictions delay the initiation of proceedings for 120 days after default and anti-eviction laws
protect residents even after foreclosure sale. 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.41(f)(1)–(2), (g); CFPB, 2013 REAL

102

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

[Vol. 10:85

closure process, statutory guardrails protect debtors from immediate eviction. 83
These delays can take months, generating additional carrying costs (including
property taxes and maintenance) that the lender will have to bear or try to recoup in an eventual sale. 84 Though foreclosure sales must be publicized, those
advertisements need not and often do not portray a property in its most attractive light. 85
When the foreclosure auction finally occurs, structural forces guarantee an
inefficient outcome. Requirements that non-creditor bidders bring cash or a
cashier’s check to the auction disincentivize third party participation while statutory rights permitting the creditor to “credit bid” the value of their debt before
committing cash provide an engrained advantage to the foreclosing lender. 86
For an underwater home, the outstanding debt is greater than the home’s value,
thereby higher than what any rational third party would pay. Even where state
law permits deficiency judgments 87 after mortgage foreclosure sales, lenders
will still take full advantage of their credit-bidding limit because foreclosedagainst debtors are likely to be judgment proof (or at least not worth the cost of
suit). Lack of property-level information exacerbates these advantages because
potential bidders do not know the condition of the house. Even if bidding appears to be a good investment on paper, hidden property damage or deferred
maintenance loom. 88 And if the debtor wants to exercise her state law right of

ESTATE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ACT (REGULATION X) AND TRUTH IN LENDING ACT
(REGULATION Z) MORTGAGE SERVICING FINAL RULES 98 (2013), https://files.consumerfinance.gov
/f/201311_cfpb_servicing-implementation-guide.pdf.
83. Id. 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.41(f)(1)–(2), (g); CFPB, supra note 83, at 98–99 (discussing timelines for the foreclosure process); see, e.g., MICHIGAN LEGAL HELP, supra note 7 (stating that in
Michigan, after foreclosure sale, the six-month redemption period must lapse before a homeowner
can be evicted from the property).
84. See Tony Guerra, Do I Pay Property Taxes on My Foreclosed House?, SFGATE,
https://homeguides.sfgate.com/pay-property-taxes-foreclosed-house-45525.html (last updated June
23, 2018).
85. See generally State of Mich., Home Foreclosure, REINVENTING MI RETIREMENT: TOOLS
AND RESOURCES TO ACHIEVE FINANCIAL SECURITY, https://www.michigan.gov/documents
/reinventretirement/Home_Foreclosure_469522_7.pdf (noting that publication is just address, foreclosure sale, and time in a qualifying periodical).
86. Amy Loftsgarden, What’s a Credit Bid in a Foreclosure?, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com
/legal-encyclopedia/what-s-a-credit-bid-in-a-foreclosure.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2020).
87. A deficiency judgment allows a creditor to sue the debtor for the difference (“deficiency”) between the amount of the outstanding debt and the amount realized through sale. The ability
to recover a deficiency provides an incentive against overbidding; where a mortgage is $200,000
and the house is worth $160,000, a lender’s $200,000 credit bid extinguishes the possibility of a
recovery above the value of the home, while a $160,000 bid preserves the possibility of collecting
some of the remaining $40,000. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. § 580b(3) (West 2015).
88. Studies suggest that properties sold in foreclosure sales lose value that they would not
have if they had been traded in another circumstance, perhaps due to foregone maintenance and upgrades. Michael K. Hollar, Regulatory Impact Analysis: Emergency Homeowners’ Loan Program,
13 CITYSCAPE 185, 188 (2011); see also Asia Simone Burns, Woman Charged After 11 dead animals Found in Foreclosed Lawrenceville Home, ATLANTA J. CONST. (July 24, 2019),
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redemption, she must pay off the full debt, an amount that is greater than the
value of the home and inclusive of the accrued costs and fees. 89
As a result, most foreclosure auctions end with the mortgage lender credit
bidding the amount of the debt and winning the home at auction. The lender
then must sell the house, either directly to an end buyer by sprucing it up and
hiring a realtor (incurring additional costs) or to an intermediary. This process
is expensive; real estate brokers typically charge sellers up to 6% of the sale
price, legal fees suck up another 2% of the loan balance, the lender is responsible for property taxes in the interim, and the lender loses the time value of its
money. 90 In 2011, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
estimated these transaction costs (dead weight losses not attributable to a drop
in home value) on a ~$150,000 outstanding principal balance to be just over
$10,000, or nearly 7% of the outstanding balance. 91 At the end of this headache, the lender will sell the home for its value (the allowed secured claim!), all
the while incurring costs, and the debtor will end up evicted.
The proposed change provides an opportunity to short-circuit this process
and cash out the secured lender’s allowed secured claim for the price it will
fetch after foreclosure, auction, and resale, without actually incurring those
transaction costs. Upon the Chapter 7 petition, the automatic stay pauses any
ongoing foreclosure proceedings. 92 The stay is powerful, affording the debtor
the opportunity to redeem the property by paying the value of the home, not the
greater debt amount. This difference is dramatic. Recalibrating the debt to accord with the home’s value makes redemption an attractive (or at least plausible) investment for financers. In 2018, the average mortgage combined loan-tovalue (CLTV) at origination was 86% (if the average house cost $100,000, the
borrower would pay a $14,000 down payment and borrow the remaining
86%). 93 Even for borrowers in the 90th percentile for FICO score, some of the
most traditionally creditworthy borrowers, the typical CLTV was 97%. 94 Lenders simply do not lend more than what the collateral is worth. Thus, reducing
the refinancing payment to accord with the home’s value via redemption creates
the opportunity for a transaction.

https://www.ajc.com/news/crime—law/woman-charged-after-dead-animals-found-foreclosedlawrenceville-home/dmmEO7SWQ6AThjK6PSyMVM/#.
89. U.C.C. § 9-623 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2010).
90. See Daniel Bortz, The Real Estate Commission: A Guide to Who Pays, How Much, and
More, https://www.realtor.com/advice/sell/real-estate-commission-explained/ (Apr. 15, 2019); RedFin, How Real Estate Commission Works, https://www.redfin.com/resources/how-much-is-realestate-agent-commission-buyer-seller (last visited Nov. 8, 2020).
91. See Hollar, supra note 88, at 187.
92. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), (4), (5) (2020).
93. HOUS. FIN. POL’Y CTR., HOUSING FINANCE AT A GLANCE: A MONTHLY CHARTBOOK, at
17 (Oct. 2018), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/99256/october_chartbook_
2018_0.pdf.
94. Id.
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Under the current system, bankruptcy is a pit stop on the way to an eventual
sale and eviction of the debtor. Assuming a niche market for home redemption
financing emerges like it has for personal property redemption, the debtor will
have access to the requisite funds, effectively refinancing their mortgage at the
actual value of the home and reducing their monthly obligation accordingly. 95
In the end, the secured creditor is better off. It has received the value of its allowed secured claim without absorbing the cost and delay of foreclosure and
resale.
2. Economic and Social Benefits for the Debtor and Society
The biggest benefit to the debtor under the proposed change is that she can
remain in her home. This benefit cannot be overstated. Depending on where a
given year falls in the economic cycle, between 625,000 and 2.87 million foreclosure proceedings occur each year. 96 A substantial portion of this displaced
population experiences some form of homelessness, with untold others making
do in partial or temporary accommodations (e.g., sleeping on a friend’s couch,
placing children in friends’ homes). According to a 2009 report by the National
Coalition for the Homeless, at least 1 in 10 homeless people had lost their
homes to foreclosure. 97 Keeping debtors in their homes prevents the harms of
foreclosure and homelessness, which aligns with the core normative and policy
judgments underpinning the bankruptcy system and gives further substance to
the debtor’s “fresh start.” The “fresh start” is important along three related dimensions: (1) it rehabilitates the debtor, turning them into a productive member
of the economy, (2) it minimizes negative health, economic, and educational
externalities, and (3) it reflects a normative judgment about societal forgiveness.
Individuals that declare bankruptcy are already at a financial disadvantage
compared to their peers. In the short term, these economic pains are felt in a
variety of ways, as debtors incur moving, administrative, and legal costs. 98 Adjusted for inflation to 2010 dollars, the average cost to homeowners of foreclosure can be over $10,000. 99 In the medium and long term, additional losses

95. See supra Part II(b) note 69.
96. See ATTOM DATA SOLUTIONS, U.S. Foreclosure Activity Drops to 13-Year Low in 2018
(Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.attomdata.com/news/most-recent/2018-year-end-foreclosure-marketreport/.
97. NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS ET AL., FORECLOSURE TO HOMELESSNESS 2009: THE
FORGOTTEN VICTIMS OF THE SUBPRIME CRISIS 5 (2009), https://www.nationalhomeless.org
/advocacy/ForeclosuretoHomelessness0609.pdf; Peter S. Goodman, Foreclosures Force ExHomeowners to Turn to Shelters, N.Y. TIMES, at 1 (Oct. 18, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com
/2009/10/19/business/economy/19foreclosed.html. See also HOUS. FIN. POL’Y CTR, supra note 93,
at 9.
98. See Hollar, supra note 88, at 187.
99. See id. (citing ANA MORENO, COST EFFECTIVENESS OF MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
PREVENTION 19–20 (1995)) (studying the outcomes of over 800 low- and moderate-income distressed homeowners who were assisted by the Mortgage Foreclosure Prevention Program in Minneapolis & St. Paul, Minnesota between 1991–1995). A portion of this loss may reflect accrued equity,
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make themselves apparent. For example, without a mortgage, the debtor receives less favorable tax treatment that can cost thousands of dollars per year. 100
Those who file for bankruptcy continue to experience debt payment difficulties
and accumulate less wealth relative to comparative nonfilers. 101
Homelessness, caused by foreclosure, exacerbates these struggles. Those
experiencing homelessness face substantial hurdles to finding and maintaining
employment, including bias from potential employers and the effects of trauma. 102 Emerging from bankruptcy, a newly discharged debtor without a home
is financially unstable and faces diminished future wealth accumulation prospects.
In addition to individual economic benefits, preventing foreclosure and
homelessness have large public economic benefits as well. Foreclosures followed by long-term vacancies harms neighboring property values by reducing
the physical appearance of the neighborhood, attracting crime, and depressing
the local economy. 103 Pre-financial crisis studies estimated the costs of a single
foreclosure on neighboring properties to be a decline in value of $1,508. 104
These value drops compound as the stigma of a foreclosed property in the
neighborhood prompts other homeowners to lower their sales prices or make
their homes available for sale in anticipation of decreased neighborhood quality. 105
If the debtors are made homeless as a result of foreclosure, additional social
costs come into play. As explained below, homeless populations have an increased risk of exposure to communicable diseases and, without adequate health
insurance or non-profit healthcare, homeless populations must use publicly
funded emergency rooms. 106 Further, state and municipal “interactions” (e.g.,
treatment, police, sanitation) with the homeless strain budgets. For example, in
a single year, Los Angeles spent tens of millions of dollars interacting with the
homeless. 107 By allowing the debtor the opportunity to redeem her homestead,
which would not be present in the case of an underwater home, reducing the cost figure in these
instances.
100. See, e.g., Tax Policy Center Briefing Book: What are the tax benefits of homeownership?, TAX POL’Y CTR., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-tax-benefitshomeownership.
101. See generally Song Han & Geng Li, Household Borrowing after Personal Bankruptcy,
43 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 491 (2011).
102. Overcoming Employment Barriers, NAT’L ALL. TO END HOMELESSNESS (Aug. 21,
2013), https://endhomelessness.org/resource/overcoming-employment-barriers/.
103. Hollar, supra note 88.
104. Id. (citing Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The External Costs of Foreclosure: The Impact of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values, 17 HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 57
(2006)).
105. Id.
106. See The Impact of Homelessness on Economic Competitiveness, AM. SEC.
PROJECT (May 1, 2018), https://www.americansecurityproject.org/impact-homelessness-economiccompetitiveness/.
107. See id.
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the Code could prevent the additional economic harms of foreclosure and homelessness without prejudicing the creditor’s rights.
Continuing, homelessness also contributes to poor health outcomes. Homeless populations are more susceptible to communicable diseases, such as hepatitis, and suffer from reduced access to medical care services in general. 108
“Chronic health problems and inaccessibility to medical and dental care can increase school absences and limit employment opportunities . . . . People without homes have higher rates of hospitalizations for physical illnesses, mental
illness and substance abuse than other populations.” 109 By preventing foreclosure-induced homelessness at the outset, my proposed statutory change would
shield bankrupt debtors from these negative health effects.
The negative externalities of foreclosure-induced homelessness are not limited to the individual filer or debtor but also extend to their families. Unsurprisingly, experiencing homelessness has a negative impact on a child’s educational
outcomes. 110 This added instability results in a 14% lower high school graduation rate compared to other low-income students and 20% compared to the
84.1% national average. 111 This gap affects the child’s job opportunities and
economic circumstances throughout the rest of the child’s working life. 112 Redemption during bankruptcy would neutralize these harms at their source, preventing childhood eviction and the attendant negative externalities.
Last, allowing the debtor to redeem her home expresses the social norms of
forgiveness and responsibility embodied in the Code. As discussed above in
Part I, the bankruptcy system has deep roots in American culture and embodies
American values. The robust discharge—more powerful than in other jurisdictions around the world 113—stands in stark contrast to the debtor’s prisons of the
past. Allowing home redemption balances the desire to forgive against the
equally powerful desire to ensure people repay their obligations. The debtor
gets a second chance under more favorable circumstances, not complete relief.

108. Id.
109. Health and Homelessness, AM PSYCHOLOGY ASS’N (2011), https://www.apa.org
/pi/ses/resources/publications/homelessness-health.
110. See Stephanie Dickrell, Child Homelessness Can Have Long-Term Consequences, SC
TIMES (June 4, 2016, 9:45 AM), https://www.sctimes.com/story/news/local/homelesskids
/2016/06/04/child-homelessness-can-have-long-term-consequences/84902750/.
111. See Mark Keierleber, 1.3 Million Homeless Students: New Federal Data Show a 70 Percent Jump in K-12 Homelessness Over Past Decade, with Big Implications for Academic Performance, THE 74 (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.the74million.org/1-3-million-homeless-students-newfederal-data-show-a-70-percent-jump-in-k-12-homelessness-over-past-decade-with-bigimplications-for-academic-performance/.
112. See Clive R. Belfield, The Economic Burden of High School Dropouts and School Suspensions in Florida, CIV. RIGHTS PROJECT, at 1 (Nov. 2014) (“Over their lifetimes, these dropouts
will have lower incomes, contribute less in taxes, rely more heavily on government health and welfare programs, and impose higher costs on the criminal justice system.”).
113. See WARREN ET AL., supra note 39, at 319.
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In short, keeping a debtor in her home through and after bankruptcy prevents a potential parade of economic, health, and educational horrors that could
afflict her, her family, and society for years to come. Even more, my proposed
change upholds the bankruptcy system’s core mission—to appropriately balance the rights of debtors and creditors—by benefitting both parties.
C. Counterarguments
As with any proposed statutory change, extending the right of redemption to
real property in bankruptcy faces challenges to its enactment and risks of its
adoption. In particular, the proposed change must combat concerns about opportunistic debtors taking advantage of cyclicality in the real estate market, political opposition to debtor-friendly legislative changes, judicial implementation,
and market development. Fortunately, solutions for these concerns can already
be found in the Code, our political process, and our jurisprudence.
1. The “Abusive Debtor” Risk
The primary argument against adopting this change follows much of the anti-debtor discourse that animated BAPCPA’s passage in 2005. Proponents of
the bill argued that the bankruptcy system and its powerful discharge was being
abused by debtors who did not need to file bankruptcy, but rather opportunistically chose to do so. 114 Extending the right of redemption to real property is
subject to criticism from the same animating concern. Most personal property
that a person could redeem, such as a car, depreciates over time, removing any
concern that the debtor would receive a windfall upon post-discharge asset appreciation. However, because real estate is a cyclical market, it is possible that
a redeemed home will later appreciate, accruing a benefit to the debtor while the
lender’s claim will be unfairly reduced. An opportunistic (or lucky) debtor
could declare bankruptcy during a market trough when the home is worth its
least, redeem the property, and recalibrate her debt at that lower level, thereby
reaping the benefit of the rising market at the mortgage lender’s expense.
While the “opportunistic debtor” conjures up a vivid picture of abuse, this
characterization does not reflect reality. Consumer debtors are loath to file
bankruptcy because of social stigma against bankruptcy. As discussed above,
the moral treatment of obligation and debt has deep roots in Western tradition.
Even today, with heightened recognition that economic and social forces outside a debtor’s control can wreak havoc on her financial security, many Americans still attribute fault to the individual—enough that filers overwhelmingly
feel stigma. 115 This idea of individual responsibility is “based on a presumption
114. See Press Release, The White House, supra note 24.
115. See Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Less Stigma or More
Financial Distress: An Empirical Analysis of the Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings, 59
STAN. L. REV. 213, 236–39 (2006); Nicola Howell & Rosalind F. Mason, Reinforcing Stigma or
Delivering a Fresh Start: Bankruptcy and Future Engagement in the Workforce, 38 UNIV. OF NEW
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of fundamental autonomy and individual agency that not only runs through the
Bankruptcy Code . . . but also through the American legal system as a
whole.” 116 Coupled with the fact that most debtors file bankruptcy as a result of
health, marital, or economic trauma, 117 a countervailing and more accurate picture of the typical debtor emerges: a debtor that files as a last resort because she
knows society will view her as a financial failure no matter what. This reluctancy suggests that debtors will not flock to bankruptcy simply to redeem their
real property when they think the market is low.
Finally, the “‘overfiling’ as a proxy for abuse” criticism is not supported by
data. Though critics point to a rising number of bankruptcy filings as evidence
of declining stigma, 118 increased filings follow broader economic trends and
credit default rates, 119 suggesting the picture is not so clear.
To the extent that redemption of real property actually incentivizes the marginal debtor to file a bankruptcy proceeding that they otherwise would not, the
aberration should not define the rule. As it stands, the Code already tolerates a
certain amount of debtor opportunism and manipulation. This is the tradeoff of
a debt-discharge system. First, the Code allows a debtor to choose whether she
wants to use the exemptions afforded to her under state law or the federal exemptions provided in the Code. 120 Here, the Code specifically permits the debtor to choose the exemptions that allow her to shield more of her assets from
creditors. That the Code already entrusts bankruptcy judges with discretion to
detect and punish abuse throughout the debtor’s proceeding, including her initial chapter choice, 121 demonstrates a legislative willingness for ad hoc policing.
This judicial determination of bad faith could be used as a tool to guard against
those marginal, egregious abuses while allowing the good faith majority of filers to benefit from my statutory change.
2. Political Opposition & Lawmaking Process
As with any statutory change, extending the right of redemption to real
property faces the challenges inherent in the political and lawmaking processes.

SOUTH WALES L. J. 1529, 1530–31 (2015); Leon Anderson & Deborah J. Thorne, Managing the
Stigma of Personal Bankruptcy, 39 SOC. FOCUS 77, 83 (2006).
116. See Yvana L.B.H. Mols, Comment, Bankruptcy Stigma and Vulnerability: Questioning
Autonomy and Structuring Resilience, 29 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 289, 290–91 (2012).
117. See WARREN ET AL., supra note 39.
118. See Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It’s Time for Means-Testing, 1999 BYU L. REV.
177, 210, 215–22 (1999).
119. See Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Less Stigma or
More Financial Distress: An Empirical Analysis of the Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings, 59 STAN. L. REV. 213, 236–39 (2006); see also Nicola Howell & Rosalind Mason, Reinforcing
Stigma or Delivering a Fresh Start: Bankruptcy and Future Engagement in the Workforce, 38 UNIV
OF NEW S. WALES L. J. 1529, 1530–31 (2015).
120. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A).
121. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1).

Fall 2020]

Bankruptcy and the Underwater Home

109

Passing substantive legislative change is difficult, especially in today’s fractured political environment. 122 Even more, because the Code reflects and embodies charged moral and policy values, small changes can be magnified. Congress’ recent aversion to helping debtors is embodied in BAPCPA’s passage in
2005. Down to the very name—”Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention”—BAPCPA
presumed unscrupulous filers and made it harder for debtors to file Chapter 7,
removing much of their agency. When the most recent substantive bankruptcy
legislation conceived of debtors as abusers, any pro-debtor change is subject to
scrutiny, even if it does not prejudice the creditor.
However, the world in 2005 was different than the world today. In 2005,
the housing market was in the middle of an unprecedented boom. 123 Though
wages were stagnant and the cost of living rising, easy credit and rising home
values disguised the financial precariousness of many American families. 124
This veneer of prosperity made it easy to believe that those who did not prosper
were partially responsible or even blameworthy. This misconception of why
people file bankruptcy fed the argument that the bankruptcy system was being
abused. In 2007, the global financial markets crashed, sending the United
States into the Great Recession. 125 The failure of the U.S. housing market precipitated this collapse. 126 In its wake, substantial financial reforms have been
passed to protect consumers, including Dodd-Frank and its creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). 127 Though these changes still face
powerful opposition, 128 their enactment represents pro-consumer legislative de-

122. Cf. Statistics and Historical Comparison, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress
/bills/statistics (showing fewer passed resolutions and enacted laws than in any other period presented).
123. See Les Christie, Real Estate: Busts Don’t Follow Booms, CNN Money (May 4, 2005,
3:29 PM) https://money.cnn.com/2005/05/03/real_estate/financing/boom_bust/index.htm (“The
number of U.S. metropolitan areas experiencing booms in real estate prices spiked 72 percent in
2004, according to a report from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).”).
124. See How Does the Current Cost of Living Compare to 20 Years Ago? INVESTOPEDIA
(Aug. 11, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/101314/what-does-current-cost-livingcompare-20-years-ago.asp; see also Kelsey Ramíirez, Mortgage Credit Availability Reaches PostCrisis High Among GSEs, Government Lenders, HOUSING WIRE (Oct. 25, 2018, 2:01 PM)
https://www.housingwire.com/articles/47227-mortgage-credit-availability-reaches-post-crisis-highamong-gses-government-lenders/; see also Jean Folger, Financial Crisis + 10: Where Are Home
Prices Now?, INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/investing/financialcrisis-10-where-are-home-prices-now/.
125. Robert Rich, The Great Recession, FED. RSRV. HIST. (Nov. 22, 2013),
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/great_recession_of_200709.
126. Kimberley Amadeo, 2007 Financial Crisis Explanation, Causes, and Timeline,
BALANCE (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.thebalance.com/2007-financial-crisis-overview-3306138.
127. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, and 15 U.S.C.).
128. See Aaron Klein, No, Dodd-Frank Was Neither Repealed Nor Gutted. Here’s What Really Happened, BROOKINGS (May 25, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/no-dodd-frank-wasneither-repealed-nor-gutted-heres-what-really-happened/; see also Kelsey Ramíirez, Payday Lender
Challenges CFPB Constitutionality in Supreme Court Petition, HOUSING WIRE (Oct. 3, 2019, 5:37
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velopments since BAPCPA’s passage. Today, the populist rhetoric of presidential candidates proves the popularity of anti-establishment impulses, both in the
financial system and beyond. 129
3. Judicial Implementation
Critics may challenge the notion that bankruptcy judges can accurately determine value and instead propose that the auction and sale foreclosure process
is a better measure, but bankruptcy judges are well-equipped to execute this
change. The Code already empowers bankruptcy judges to determine value in
several areas, including the value of the secured lender’s allowed secured claim,
which definitionally includes a valuation of the collateral. 130 In addition, as discussed above, judges are already empowered to penalize abusive filers with
dismissal or denial of discharge when necessary. Lastly, statutory restrictions
on repeat filing allay concerns that debtors will quickly refile if they face foreclosure proceedings again. 131
4. Market Development
Perhaps the most daunting obstacle facing my proposed change is that its
success is predicated on the development of a functional home redemption financing market. However, a functioning home redemption financing market is
likely to develop. First, the very existence of the personal property redemption
financing industry suggests that lenders do not automatically disqualify recently
bankrupt debtors. In addition, anecdotal evidence of recent filers receiving
credit card offers via the mail also suggests that the belief in the creditworthiness of recently bankrupt debtors is less idiosyncratic and more broadly accepted. Indeed, some lenders offer and advertise financial products specifically designed for debtors who recently went through bankruptcy. 132

PM),
https://www.housingwire.com/articles/payday-lender-challenges-cfpb-constitutionality-insupreme-court-petition/.
129. See Benjamin Wallace-Wells, The Expert Efficiency of Elizabeth Warren’s Populist
Campaign, NEW YORKER (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/the-politicalscene/what-kind-of-populist-is-elizabeth-warren; see also John Cassidy, Bernie Sanders and the
New Populism, NEW YORKER (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy
/bernie-sanders-and-the-new-populism; Charles Postel, If Trump and Sanders Are Both Populists,
What Does Populist Mean?, ORG. OF AM. HISTORIANS (Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.oah.org/tah
/issues/2016/february/if-trump-and-sanders-are-both-populists-what-does-populist-mean/.
130. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
131. See Repeat Filings, JUSTIA (Nov. 2018), https://www.justia.com/bankruptcy/repeatfilings/ (discussing restrictions on refiling bankruptcy).
132. See Song Han et al., Information, Contract Design, and Unsecured Credit Supply: Evidence from Credit Card Mailings, FIN. & ECON. DISCUSSION SERIES 2015-103 (describing how
lenders tailor advertising and financial products around a borrower’s bankruptcy); see, e.g., Fresh
Start Loan, FREESTAR FINANCIAL CREDIT UNION, https://www.freestarfinancial.com/fresh-startloan (last visited Nov. 30, 2020) (advertising “Fresh Start Loans” to help recently bankrupt borrowers “re-establish [their] credit”); Brandon A. Dorfman, Bankruptcy Promised Me a Fresh Start.
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Homes also have an entirely different loan collateral profile than do cars,
and the lending markets differ in material ways. All cars depreciate, no matter
what, all the time. While this may not apply to “classic” or other cars bought
for investment purposes, such cars are not common or widespread enough to
merit extended discussion. As a result, as soon as the auto lender issues funds,
the value of their collateral decreases. Home values, as noted above, are more
cyclical. The prospect that the collateral will appreciate, which animates those
obsessed with the “abusive debtor,” is a tally in favor of the creditworthiness of
the loan. If the home appreciates, the lender’s collateral coverage improves automatically. These differences can cut against real property redemption as well:
larger loan sizes make diversification more difficult for lenders, longer repayment terms increase exposure to risk of default, and heavier regulation increases
compliance costs. 133 Perhaps most salient are the differences related to foreclosure—repossession of cars is far cheaper and faster than repossession of
homes. 134
While little information is publicly available on redemption financers’ approval rates, required loan-to-value ratios, or other underwriting criteria, down
payment requirements make redemption financing more attractive to the lender.
Though required down payments reduce the number of people who are able to
redeem their homes by raising a threshold obstacle, they build an equity cushion
into the redeemed home’s new capital structure, benefitting the lender. For
debtors able to clear this hurdle, the price of staying in their home would drop
substantially. 135
Finally, few Chapter 7 debtors actually elect to redeem their cars. 136 While
detailed information is not available on the reasons, this phenomenon is partially explained by the down payment hurdle, the debtor’s lack of effective counPredatory Lenders Are Trying to Ruin It, Talk Poverty (Dec. 10, 2019), https://talkpoverty.org
/2019/12/10/bankruptcy-debt-predatory-lenders/ (describing how the author, a recent bankruptcy
filer and recipient of a discharge, receives roughly “10 credit card offers per month, not including
solicitations for auto loans, payday loans, and mortgage refinances”).
133. Compare CHERYL R. COOPER, CONG. RSCH SERV, IF 11192, THE AUTOMOBILE
LENDING MARKET AND POLICY ISSUES (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF11192.pdf (noting that
auto lenders are subject to regulation by the CFPB and must comply with other fair lending legislation like the Equal Credit Opportunity Act) with CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44918, WHO REGULATES
WHOM? AN OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK (2020),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44918.pdf (highlighting the regulators covering bank and non-bank
mortgage originators and purchasers, including the CFPB, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), FDIC, Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA)).
134. Home foreclosure incurs the time, maintenance, tax and other costs. See supra Part
III(b)(i). Repossessing a car, on the other hand, only requires finding a vendor with a tow truck or
activating a pre-installed remote “kill switch”. See, e.g., Elaine S. Povich, Late Payment? A ‘Kill
Switch’ Can Strand You and Your Car, STATELINE (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en
/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/11/27/late-payment-a-kill-switch-can-strand-you-andyour-car.
135. See supra Part II(b); see also supra Part II(b) note 69.
136. Pamela Foohey et al., Driven to Bankruptcy, 55 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming
2020) (manuscript at 23) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3451565).
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selling or information about redemption’s availability, and the superficial attractiveness of ride through or reaffirmation. Whatever the reason, this suggests
that the structures preventing debtors from redeeming their cars may similarly
prevent debtors in a potential home redemption market. To the extent this phenomenon is due to ineffective information or counselling of consumers, those
problems exist elsewhere in the legal system and are not solved by forgoing
progressive incremental change simply because it may not be widely used. Inasmuch as low redemption rates are attributable to market conditions, those
conditions should not defeat a cheap and straightforward change that will improve the lives of the consumer debtors who can use it.
CONCLUSION
The simple statutory change outlined in this Note would extend the welltrodden right of redemption to real property in bankruptcy, effectively allowing
the debtor to refinance her mortgage to reflect the actual value of her home. By
empowering debtors to remain in their homes, extending the right to redeem to
real property in Chapter 7 bankruptcy would protect debtors from homelessness
and its negative economic, health, and educational outcomes. Though critics
may allege real property is not appropriate for redemption in bankruptcy, these
criticisms are misguided. Admittedly, this change will not keep every debtor in
her home, but the Bankruptcy Code is littered with tradeoffs. For the families it
would help, real property redemption may make all the difference.

